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History shows that new technologies do not move instantly
from the inventor's laboratory to everyday usage. It can take
a long time for them to increase productivity. The absence
of immediate productivity improvement with the advent of new
information processing technology was not unlike earlier experiences
with general-purpose technologies. Similar delays in the impact
of technological progress on aggregate productivity occurred
during past industrial revolutions.
Part of the delay, according to Northwestern University economist
Joel Mokyr, occurs because, important as they are, fundamental
technological breakthroughs often require further inventions
to make them broadly applicable: "Such gap-filling inventions
are often the result of on-the-job learning or of a development
by a firm's engineers realizing ad hoc opportunities to produce
a good cheaper or better. Over time, a long sequence of such
microinventions may lead to major gains in productivity, impressive
advances in quality, fuel and material savings, durability
and so on."
For example:
Although Thomas Newcomen built the first successful
steam engine in 1712, it was not until about 1765 that major
improvements in the engine by James Watt made it suitable
for factory use. Additional improvements, which included the
addition of a governor and rotary movement, made the steam
engine a huge economic success in the 19th century. Recent
estimates suggest that at the height of the British Industrial
Revolution (1760 to 1830) output per capita in the United
Kingdom grew at less than 0.5 percent per year on average,
about the same rate as during the period between 1700 and
1760. By comparison, per capita output increased at an average
rate of nearly 2 percent per year from 1830 to 1870. Mokyr
argues that despite slow growth during the era of high invention,
rapid growth in Britain after 1830 could not have occurred
without the technological breakthroughs of the previous 70
years.
Although Michael Faraday invented the first electric
motor in 1821 and the dynamo in 1831, it took nearly a century
of additional, substantial breakthroughs to make electricity
the dominant source of power in manufacturing. Despite major
technological breakthroughs in electricity, chemicals, steel
production and other major sectors, American manufacturing
productivity slowed in the late 19th century. Whereas output
per hour increased at 1.7 percent per year from 1869 to 1889,
output per hour increased at just 1.4 percent per year from
1889 to 1909. U.S. manufacturing productivity growth remained
modest until after World War I, but grew during the 1920s
at an astounding rate of 5.6 percent per year. Productivity
growth remained high for another 40 years.
As with the steam engine and electric motor, the computer
chip did not affect productivity in many industries until
additional inventions came along to apply the new technology.
In banking, for example, microinventions like the ATM, the
debit card and credit-scoring software were required to generate
the productivity gains promised by the computer.
Stanford University economist Paul David explores the dynamics
of technological diffusion by comparing the electric dynamo,
a key technological advance of the 19th century, with the
modern computer. The dynamo, like the computer and steam engine,
is a general-purpose technology, having profound effects on
nearly all sectors of the economy. Decades elapsed, however,
between the introduction of reliable electric motors and their
widespread use in industry. Some of the delay was accounted
for by lags in the development of efficient means of electric
power generation and by competition between direct and alternating
current. Electric power generation was reasonably efficient
and commercially viable by 1880, however, and the superiority
of alternating current for most applications was clear by
1893. Yet, as the chart to the left illustrates, electricity
accounted for just 5 percent of mechanical power in U.S. manufacturing
in 1900 and did not exceed 50 percent until 1920.
"Part of the delay in the exploitation of the potential industrial
productivity gains offered by the [electric] dynamo," according
to David, "was due simply to the durability of old manufacturing
plants embodying technology adapted to the regime of mechanical
power derived from water and steam." A slow rate of decline
in the cost of adopting electric power also contributed to
the delay. Between 1907 and 1917, the price of electricity
to industrial users dropped sharply, however, and the technology
began to spread rapidly.
Once electricity accounted for some 50 percent of the power
sources used in American manufacturing, U.S. productivity
began to accelerate. Electrification enhanced productivity
by affording greater flexibility and more efficient use of
labor and capital in manufacturing. For example, electrification
enabled more use of continuous-process techniques, such as
the factory assembly line, which often reduced production
times and waste. Efficiency was improved also by the wide
adoption of "unit drive," that is, the use of dedicated electric
motors to power individual machines and tools, rather than
a system of shafts and belts powered by a single engine. Unit
drive brought savings through reduced energy usage, less wear
and tear, and more flexible and efficient factory design.
Electrification also enhanced productivity by improving factory
lighting and safety.
The histories of the steam engine and the electric dynamo
show us that delays of years or even decades from the initial
invention of a general-purpose technology and its impact on
aggregate productivity and standard of living should not be
surprising. Follow-up inventions and adaptations of existing
workplaces and products to the new technology are required
before large productivity gains arise. Is there any way to
ensure that such microinventions do occur--that fundamental
technological breakthroughs lead to growth in productivity
and standard of living?
Many observers believe that a country's economic performance
is related to its political and economic institutions. Countries
with stable, democratic political systems, limited government
involvement in economic decision-making, but strong protection
of property rights, are thought to have institutions that
are conducive for technological progress and economic growth.
We turn next to how public policy might affect growth and
what the histories of past industrial revolutions might teach
us.
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