Tracking AI’s Contribution to GDP Growth

Since the arrival of ChatGPT in 2022, generative artificial intelligence technologies have been reshaping the way we work and live. As of August 2025, generative AI tools were used by 55% of people and 37% of workers in the U.S.See Alexander Bick, Adam Blandin and David Deming’s Nov. 13 On the Economy blog post, “The State of Generative AI Adoption in 2025.” While there is an ongoing debate about how AI will impact productivity and growth going forward,For example, see Yong Suk Lee, Taekyun Kim, Sukwoong Choi and Wonjoon Kim’s 2022 article, “When Does AI Pay Off? AI-adoption Intensity, Complementary Investments, and R&D Strategy,” in Technovation, and Erik Brynjolfsson, Daniel Rock and Chad Syverson’s 2018 working paper, “The Productivity J-Curve: How Intangibles Complement General Purpose Technologies.” the technology is already affecting gross domestic product (GDP) numbers through its associated investment boom.

As adoption continues to spread and new uses for AI tools emerge, substantial complementary investment in hardware, software, research and development (R&D), and new data centers will be required. This investment surge drew particular attention as an important driver of growth in the first half of 2025. Using newly released GDP data for the third quarter of 2025, this post measures how much these AI-related investment categories are contributing to real GDP growth and compares the current investment boom with that of the dot-com era (mid-1990s to 2000).

Measuring the Contribution of AI-Related Categories to Real GDP Growth

To measure how AI-related investment is showing up in GDP, we focus on components of nonresidential fixed investment that capture the infrastructure behind AI adoption and related investments in software and R&D.While not all R&D is AI-related, some AI-related investment, including new model developments or exploratory software projects for how to implement AI, will show up in R&D. Specifically, we use three Bureau of Economic Analysis data series—software, R&D, and information processing equipment—along with Census Bureau data on data-center construction (available beginning in 2014).

For each series, we measure its contribution (in annualized percentage points) to real GDP growth. This contribution can be approximated as the category’s real growth rate multiplied by its share of GDP.The contribution of a variable to the real GDP growth is calculated by the Fisher-Tornqvist formula: $${\mathrm{<em>Contrib\; Q</em>}}_{\mathrm{<em>t</em>}}=400\left[\frac{1}{2}\right(\frac{{\mathrm{<em>NomQ</em>}}_{\mathrm{<em>t</em>}}}{\mathrm{<em>NomGDP</em>}\mathrm{<em>t</em>}}+\frac{{\mathrm{<em>NomQ</em>}}_{\mathrm{<em>t-1</em>}}}{\mathrm{<em>NomGDP</em>}\mathrm{<em>t-1</em>}}\left)\right]({\mathrm{<em>lnQ</em>}}_{\mathrm{<em>t</em>}}-{\mathrm{<em>lnQ</em>}}_{\mathrm{<em>t-1</em>}})$$ Q_t denotes the quantity of the variable at time t.

Trends in the Contribution of AI-Related Components to Real GDP Growth

The figures below show how the major AI-related investment categories have contributed to real GDP growth over time (with data center investment included beginning in 2014).

Investments in Information Processing Equipment: Contribution to GDP Growth

SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis and authors’ calculations.

NOTE: Shaded areas represent recessions.

Investments in Software: Contribution to GDP Growth

SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis and authors’ calculations.

NOTE: Shaded areas represent recessions.

Investments in R&D: Contribution to GDP Growth

SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis and authors’ calculations.

NOTE: Shaded areas represent recessions.

Investments in Data Centers: Contribution to GDP Growth

SOURCES: Census Bureau and authors’ calculations.

NOTES: The shaded area represents a recession. The latest available number for data centers is for August; to obtain a third-quarter number, we imputed the number for September by taking the average of data center spending for July and August.

The first table reports the contributions of the four investment categories in the first three quarters of 2025 and compares those values with their long-run averages and standard deviations.

In the first quarter of 2025, the contribution of information processing equipment (IPE) to real GDP growth jumped to 0.90 percentage points, which is more than two standard deviations above its long-run average. This indicates a higher than normal contribution of IPE to GDP growth in the first quarter of 2025. However, the contribution returned to the normal range by the second quarter, and by the third quarter was at 0.16, slightly less than its long-run average.

The decline in the contribution of IPE in the second quarter was partly offset by the increase in the contribution of software. Its contribution in the second quarter of 2025 of 0.57 percentage points was well above its long-run average of 0.1 percentage points, reaching a new historical peak. For comparison, prior highs were 0.44 percentage points during the dot-com period in 1997 and 0.49 percentage points during the COVID-19 era’s tech investment surge in 2021. However, this leveled off to 0.07 percentage points in the third quarter, just under its long-run average.

Likewise, the contribution of R&D jumped in the second quarter of 2025 to 0.22 percentage points and remained at the same level in the third quarter, more than one standard deviation above its long-run historical average, though within the range seen during the COVID-19 era.

The contribution of data center investment to the growth spiked in the first quarter of 2023 and remained elevated through the second quarter of 2025. Its contribution reached 0.15 percentage points in the second quarter of 2025, more than two standard deviations above its long-run average. However, the contribution returned to 0.03, within its normal range, in the third quarter.

Why has the contribution of these investment categories to real GDP normalized despite the ongoing AI investment boom? The decline does not reflect a drop in the level of investment in IPE, software, R&D, or data centers; all four categories have remained elevated since early 2025. Rather, their contribution fell because investment growth slowed: After a period of rapid expansion, investment leveled off. Contributions to GDP growth depend on growth, not high levels alone.

Together the four categories contributed 1.3 percentage points to real GDP growth in the first quarter of 2025 and 1.16 percentage points to real GDP growth in the second quarter, but the combined contribution leveled off to 0.48 percentage points in the third quarter. The contribution helped prevent a sharper contraction in the first quarter and accounted for 30% of GDP growth in the second quarter and 11% of GDP growth in the third quarter.

Comparison to the Dot-com Boom

The scale and speed of recent AI investment have prompted comparisons with IT investments during the dot-com period. The next table provides the contributions of identical categories of investment to real GDP growth for the years 2000 and 2025. The tables are calculated by taking the average of data available over the first three quarters of 2025 and over the four quarters of 2000, during the height of the dot-com era’s investment boom.

IPE’s contribution is similar across the two periods: 0.58 percentage points (20% of GDP growth) in 2000 versus 0.42 percentage points (17%) in the first nine months of 2025. However, the contribution of software is significantly higher in 2025 at 0.35 percentage points (14%) compared with 0.11 percentage points (3.7%) in 2000.

Together, the AI categories contributed 0.97 percentage points to real GDP growth in the first three quarters of 2025 (0.90 percentage points, excluding data centers, for which data were not available in 2000), higher than the 0.81 percentage points in 2000. Through the third quarter of 2025, these categories made up 39% (36% excluding data centers) of total GDP growth versus 28% in 2000.

Putting It All Together

Our analysis suggests that the recent investments in AI-related categories have contributed significantly to the real GDP growth in 2025. It has surpassed the contribution of IT components to the real GDP growth made during the dot-com boom, both in levels and as a share of GDP. As firms continue integrating AI into their operations and building the infrastructure required to support it, these categories are likely to remain significant drivers of investment well into 2026 and beyond.

Notes

1. See Alexander Bick, Adam Blandin and David Deming’s Nov. 13 On the Economy blog post, “The State of Generative AI Adoption in 2025.”
2. For example, see Yong Suk Lee, Taekyun Kim, Sukwoong Choi and Wonjoon Kim’s 2022 article, “When Does AI Pay Off? AI-adoption Intensity, Complementary Investments, and R&D Strategy,” in Technovation, and Erik Brynjolfsson, Daniel Rock and Chad Syverson’s 2018 working paper, “The Productivity J-Curve: How Intangibles Complement General Purpose Technologies.”
3. While not all R&D is AI-related, some AI-related investment, including new model developments or exploratory software projects for how to implement AI, will show up in R&D.
4. The contribution of a variable to the real GDP growth is calculated by the Fisher-Tornqvist formula: $${\mathrm{<em>Contrib\; Q</em>}}_{\mathrm{<em>t</em>}}=400\left[\frac{1}{2}\right(\frac{{\mathrm{<em>NomQ</em>}}_{\mathrm{<em>t</em>}}}{\mathrm{<em>NomGDP</em>}\mathrm{<em>t</em>}}+\frac{{\mathrm{<em>NomQ</em>}}_{\mathrm{<em>t-1</em>}}}{\mathrm{<em>NomGDP</em>}\mathrm{<em>t-1</em>}}\left)\right]({\mathrm{<em>lnQ</em>}}_{\mathrm{<em>t</em>}}-{\mathrm{<em>lnQ</em>}}_{\mathrm{<em>t-1</em>}})$$

   Q_t denotes the quantity of the variable at time t.