### Quantitative easing: Entrance and exit strategies

Alan S. Blinder Princeton University Homer Jones Memorial Lecture Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis April 1, 2010



#### Outline



- 1. The conceptual basis for quantitative easing
- 2. The Fed's entrance strategy
- 3. The Fed's exit strategy
- 4. Implications for central bank independence
- 5. Wrapping up

# 1. The conceptual basis for quantitative easing



# The problem and a possible solution

□ The zero lower bound on nominal interest rate

- "liquidity trap"
- >  $r = i \pi can't$  get negative enough.
- Friedman's warning about fixing i: dynamic instability
- Idea: Shrink term and/or risk premiums
- $\succ$   $R_j = r + \rho_j$
- Requires imperfect substitutes or "frictions"

#### Specific strategies



To shrink term premiums

- Buy long-term government bonds...
   -- and sell T-bills
  - -- by creating new bank reserves
- Relies on imperfect arbitrage across yield curve
- Another option: commit to keeping the overnight rate low for a long time


#### To shrink risk premiums

- Buy the risky asset...
  - -- and sell the safe asset
  - -- by creating new bank reserves


### 2. The Fed's entrance strategy




#### The funds rate first



# Early QE did *not* blow up Fed's balance sheet...



#### ...nor increase bank reserves much



#### Simplified Fed balance sheet **ASSETS LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH Treasury securities** Currency Less liquid assets **Bank Reserves** Treasury deposits Loans

Capital

#### Swapping assets

#### ASSETS

#### LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH

#### Treasury securities↓

Less liquid assets 1

#### Loans


Currency

**Bank Reserves** 

Treasury deposits

Capital


# 2008: Composition of the Fed's balance sheet starts to change




#### Adding Treasury deposits **ASSETS LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH Treasury securities** Currency Less liquid assets 1 **Bank Reserves** Loans 1

Capital


#### So bank reserves hardly budged




#### Lehman changed everything



### Lehman changed everything



### Lehman changed everything



#### Two-stages in QE entrance



<u>Stage I</u> Ad hoc, reactive, institution-based Ex: Bear, AIG,...

<u>Stage II</u> Systematic, thoughtful, market-based Ex: CPFF, MBS,...


#### Working on risk premiums

 $R_i = r + \rho_i$ 


riskless rate

#### Did it work?

#### CP vs. T-Bill risk spread



#### Corporate bond vs. T-note risk spread



# 3. The Fed's exit strategy




### Bernanke's list




- 1. Phase out liquidity facilities  $\leftarrow$  gets for free
- 2. Normalize discount lending  $\leftarrow$  supplements 1
- B. Passively shrink MBS/GSE debt ← gets for free
- 4. Increase interest rate on reserves ← novel
- 5. Offer banks "CDs" ← novel
- 6. Reverse repos ← conventional OMO, discretionary
- 7. Outright asset sales ← conventional OMO, discretionary

### Offering banks CDs




### The mountain of reserves




Simplified Fed	balance sheet
ASSETS	LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH
Treasury securities	Currency
Less liquid assets 🗸	Bank Reserves 🗸
Loans 🗸	Treasury deposits

Capital

# The market for bank reserves with a floor



#### The market for bank reserves with a corridor



# 4. Quantitative easing and central bank independence



#### Quasi-fiscal operations

#### Section 13(3) of FRA:

HAT ACT

 TO A ACT

Congress of the United States of Americ

In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such periods as the said board may determine, ... to discount **for** any individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal *Reserve bank.* (emphasis added)

# Fixing Section 13(3)



- Require permission of the Secretary of the Treasury (or the FSOC)
- Require prompt reporting to the two banking committees (confidential for a while)
- These ideas are in both bills.

#### An important note and a question



 The Fed has *never* had as much independence in the regulatory sphere as it has in monetary policy.

What happens when Section 13(3) actions are the Fed's monetary policy?

# 5. Summing up



